In Need of Better Material:
A New Approach to Implementation
Challenges Under the IDEA
Annie Kors†
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides a substantive guarantee to a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to students with disabilities. The education is to be provided “in conformity with” an “individualized
education program” (IEP): an educational plan for the student that is created
through a statutorily defined process. Scholars and courts have focused tremendous
attention on the level of educational quality that an IEP must offer to meet the
IDEA’s requirements. But the creation of an adequate plan is, of course, not the end
of the story; the school district then has to implement the plan. This leaves an important question: How far may a school district deviate from the services specified
in an IEP and remain in compliance with the IDEA? In other words, how much of
the adequate written plan is the student in fact entitled to receive? There are two
existing approaches to failure-to-implement cases: the materiality approach and the
per se test.
This Comment argues that both approaches are flawed. The materiality standard circumvents the procedural protections of the IDEA, provides little predictability
to parents and schools, offers little guidance to courts, forces judges away from areas
of institutional competence, and incentivizes school districts to overpromise and underdeliver. The per se rule, on the other hand, is insufficiently flexible given its practical and statutory constraints, would disincentivize ambition and innovation in
IEPs, and is unlikely to be adopted by courts.
This Comment proposes a new approach—a burden-shifting test that accounts
for both (1) unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances and (2) the proportionality of
the school’s response to those circumstances. This approach integrates the benefits
of both the materiality inquiry and the per se rule. It better honors several important
aspects of the statutory scheme, better aligns with the statutory text, and accords
with Supreme Court precedent. It also encourages IEP drafters to craft realistic
plans that nonetheless aspire to deliver the best results for students.
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INTRODUCTION
For much of U.S. history, children with disabilities were excluded from the public education system entirely.1 When they
were admitted to schools, the education and services that they
received were often deeply inadequate and unresponsive to their
circumstances.2 In response to parents’ and advocates’ legal victories in the early 1970s, these practices began to change, but the
change was slow and incomplete.3 In 1990, Congress passed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act4 (IDEA) to provide a
national response to the deficiency.
The IDEA is the primary federal statute governing the provision of education to children with disabilities. The IDEA requires
school districts to provide eligible children with a “free appropriate public education”5 (FAPE). The services that make up the
FAPE must be provided “in conformity with [an] individualized
education program”6 (IEP), as embodied in a written statement of
1
2
3
4
5
6

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.A.
Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D).
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the school district’s educational plan for each eligible student.7 In
other words, an IEP is the plan for the education of a student with
disabilities. The Supreme Court has held that the FAPE requirement establishes a substantive, statutory right to an education of
a certain caliber.8 More specifically, the school must “offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”9 As of the 2019–20
school year, 7.3 million students—14% of all public school students—were receiving special education services through IEPs
under the IDEA.10
Most legal challenges under the IDEA focus on alleged inadequacies in IEPs as written. The proper standard for evaluating
the content of IEPs has been the subject of extensive scholarship
and decades of focus from federal courts.11 But the creation of an
adequate plan is, of course, not the end of the story. The school
district must then carry out the plan that it has formulated.
This leaves a key question that has been relatively underdiscussed by both courts and scholars: How far may a school district
deviate from the services specified in the IEP document while remaining in compliance with IDEA? In other words, how much of
the written plan is a student entitled to receive to ensure a FAPE?
Parents may bring suit for a school district’s failure to implement
an individualized education plan.12
There are two existing approaches to failure-to-implement
cases in the courts and the literature. The first approach, adopted
by every federal appellate court to address the issue, is a materiality standard.13 As this Comment explores in Part II, however,
the materiality inquiry is vague and unpredictable—both in
theory and in practice—leading to inconsistencies and inadequate
protection for students. One notable dissent in the Ninth Circuit
vehemently argued against the materiality approach for similar

7

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200–02 (1982); see also Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE–1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998–99 (2017).
9
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
10 Students with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (last updated May 2021),
https://perma.cc/EFN9-RAXF.
11 See infra Part I.C. See generally Terrye Conroy & Mitchell L. Yell, Free Appropriate Public Education After Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017), 35 TOURO
L. REV. 101 (2019).
12 See, e.g., L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd., 927 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2019).
13 See, e.g., id. at 1213 & n.6.
8
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reasons.14 It advocated instead for the second approach—a per se
test—under which any deviation from an IEP, no matter how
small or unavoidable, would be an IDEA violation. 15 Robust alternative approaches have not been seriously considered by scholars or courts.
This Comment argues for a new approach to failure-to-implement cases: a burden-shifting test requiring the school district to
demonstrate that (1) any implementation failures were the result
of unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances and (2) the school responded proportionally in light of those circumstances by amending the IEP as soon as possible and providing compensatory services in the meantime. Part I provides the necessary legal
background. It describes the purpose and structure of the IDEA
at a high level, outlines major doctrinal developments around the
meaning of a FAPE, and establishes the legal bases for failure-toimplement cases. Part II explores the two existing approaches. It
examines the varying and sometimes inconsistent ways that
courts have understood and applied the materiality standard. It
then highlights the many problems with both the materiality and
per se approaches. Part III proposes a new approach to implementation cases. It argues that the new standard is more in line with
the statutory scheme, more consistent with precedent, and more
desirable on policy grounds.
The stakes for the resolution of this issue are high. The current quagmire of implementation case law fails to provide clear
notice to parents or school officials and makes negotiating solutions and settlements challenging. The educational outcome in
each individual dispute can acutely impact the student and their
family. There’s also a lot of money in play: school districts that
fail to provide a FAPE can be required to reimburse parents for
private educational services obtained in the meantime,

14 Van Duyn ex. rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 826 (9th Cir.
2007) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 826–27; see also id. at 822 n.4 (majority opinion) (describing the dissent’s
proposed test as a per se test).
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potentially including compensatory services,16 private school tuition,17 and attorneys’ fees and costs.18
Further, the materiality standard currently permits schools
to deny students their rights under the IDEA. Specifically, if a
school has promised the minimum amount required by Supreme
Court precedent in the content of the plan, then even a small deviation during implementation might result in a child receiving
less support than the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee entitles them to.
In such a circumstance, neither a content nor an implementation
challenge would succeed. Thus, the current materiality approach
creates a doctrinal gap—students can be denied a FAPE but have
no legal recourse. This doctrinal gap incentivizes schools to overpromise instead of encouraging schools to focus on creating realistic IEPs that optimize the use of the school’s resources. The
tradeoffs and judgment calls that school officials make should be
part of the IEP process, not subsequent to it. If school districts
ultimately lack the resources necessary to provide the services in
IEPs that meet the statutory minimum, then that issue needs to
come to the fore.19
Finally, schools have remained responsible for providing a
FAPE throughout the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic.20
Parents across the country are beginning to bring claims for compensatory services in state agencies and federal courts.21 The need
for a coherent and legally sound standard for failure-toimplement cases is more urgent than ever.

16

See, e.g., G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009) (“[The] IDEA
authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services when a school
district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate.”); Spring
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. O.W. ex rel. Hannah W., 961 F.3d 781, 799–800 (5th Cir. 2020)
(extending the reimbursement and compensation analysis to an implementation case).
18 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
19 Congress originally promised to provide 40% “of the average cost to educate a child
with disabilities,” and it later amended the law to cap federal funding at a maximum of
40% of costs per student. As of 2018, Congress covered only 18% of the costs per student.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BROKEN PROMISES: THE UNDERFUNDING OF IDEA
13 (2018).
20 See, e.g., KATHERINE NEAS & DAVID CANTRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. OF
SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., OSEP DCL 21-01, RETURN TO SCHOOL ROADMAP:
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES UNDER IDEA 2–3 (2021), https://perma.cc/Z3B9-P8GV.
21 See, e.g., Cory Turner & Rebecca Klein, After Months of Special Education Turmoil, Families Say Schools Owe Them, NPR (June 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/6542-YGGN.
17
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part provides the legal background necessary for understanding implementation challenges. Part I.A describes the lack
of education that was available to children with disabilities before
the IDEA and advocates’ legal victories that helped shape the application of the statute. Part I.B lays out the relevant statutory
framework, emphasizing the importance of parental involvement
and parents’ procedural protections to the statutory scheme.
Part I.C explores Supreme Court precedent identifying and explaining the content of the IDEA’s substantive right to a FAPE.
Finally, Part I.D turns to implementation challenges and ground
them in the statutory language and case law.
A. Before the IDEA
Prior to the passage of the IDEA, students with disabilities
had very limited opportunities to receive a public education.
“Through most of the history of public schools in America,” only
“minimal” services were provided to children with disabilities,
and such services were entirely discretionary.22 Schools frequently “exclud[ed] some children because of their supposed ‘depressing and nauseating’ impact on their peers.”23 In fact, “[u]ntil
the mid-1970s, laws in most states allowed school districts to refuse to enroll any student they considered ‘uneducable,’ a term
generally defined by local school administrators.”24
Inspired by the civil rights movement and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,25 “parents and
advocacy groups [ ] beg[a]n using the courts in an attempt to force
states to provide a public education that was appropriate for their
children’s unique needs.”26 This effort won two early, substantial
22 Edwin W. Martin, Reed Martin & Donna L. Terman, The Legislative and Litigation History of Special Education, 6 FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1996, at 25, 26.
23 Jeffrey A. Knight, Comment, When Close Enough Doesn’t Cut It: Why Courts
Should Want to Steer Clear of Determining What Is—and What Is Not—Material in a
Child’s Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (quoting State
ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153, 154 (Wis. 1919)); see also id. at 384 (“While
the shortcomings were many, several that stood out: the hiring of special-education providers who failed to meet school standards; overcrowded classrooms, resulting in teachers
failing to provide an appropriate education; and schools overlooking disabled children by
not providing direct services to them.”).
24 Martin et al., supra note 22, at 26.
25 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26 Antonis Katsiyannis, Mitchell L. Yell & Renee Bradley, Reflections on the 25th
Anniversary of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL
EDUC. 324, 325 (2001).
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victories. In the early 1970s, both Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC)27 and Mills v. Board of
Education28 “resulted in schools being required to provide educational services to students with disabilities.”29 These cases introduced a few principles that would become foundational to defining the educational rights of children with disabilities. PARC
introduced the notion of “appropriateness—that is, that each
child be offered an education appropriate to his or her learning
capacities.”30 Additionally, Mills required that when a school considered changing the enrollment status of students with disabilities (e.g., placement in or removal from special education), “the
children were entitled to full procedural protections, including notice of proposed changes, access to school records, a right to be
heard and to be represented by legal counsel at hearings to determine changes in individual programs, and regularly scheduled
status reviews.”31
In the immediate aftermath, despite similar litigation successes in many states and the passage of several state laws to the
same effect, students with disabilities were still frequently denied
educational services.32 The national landscape was inconsistent,
and even states with better laws provided services inconsistently.33 According to congressional findings from 1974, “more than
1.75 million students with disabilities did not receive educational
services,” and more than 3 million of those who were enrolled
were not receiving an appropriate education.34 Still, “the education of children with disabilities was seen as a privilege, rather
than a right.”35 The insufficiency and inconsistency prompted
Congress to act.
B. The IDEA—FAPE and IEPs
In 1975, Congress passed the IDEA36 in order “to ensure that
all children with disabilities have available to them a free
27

334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
29 Katsiyannis et al., supra note 26, at 325.
30 Martin et al., supra note 22, at 28; see also PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258–60.
31 Martin et al., supra note 22, at 28; see also Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 880–81.
32 Katsiyannis et al., supra note 26, at 325.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 324–25.
35 Id. at 325.
36 The IDEA was originally titled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. It took on its current name after the 1990
28
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appropriate public education that emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent
living.”37 According to the House Report, this “ambitious” piece of
federal legislation “was passed in response to Congress’ perception that a majority of handicapped children in the United States
‘were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in
regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough
to ‘drop out.’” 38
The law incorporated key aspects of the PARC and Mills decisions. In particular, the statute adopted these decisions’ emphasis on procedural safeguards and educational appropriateness.
The IDEA is heavily process focused. The core notion is that the
best substantive outcomes will be reached for children with disabilities by involving parents in their children’s education and by
giving them formal procedural rights to object to and appeal
school decisions. The Supreme Court has attributed this in part
to Congress’s “aware[ness] that schools had all too often denied
such children appropriate educations without in any way consulting their parents.”39 In addition to the procedural protections,
Congress added a substantive guarantee: every child is entitled
to a “free appropriate public education.”40
Specifically, the IDEA provides state and local agencies federal funding to support the education of children with disabilities
and “conditions such funding upon a State’s compliance with extensive goals and procedures.”41 Each state that receives money
under IDEA must make a FAPE available to all eligible children.42 As defined in the statute, a FAPE includes both “special
education and related services.”43 “Special education” means “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the
unique needs of a child with a disability.”44 “Related services” refers to “developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
amendments. See Katsiyannis et al., supra note 26, at 324, 327. This Comment refers to
the law as the IDEA throughout. For a useful description of the IDEA’s many amended
forms, see generally Knight, supra note 23.
37 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
38 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).
39 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
40 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(1).
41 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179.
42 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
43 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
44 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29).
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. . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education.”45
The statutory definition of a FAPE imposes four explicit requirements. The special education and related services must
“have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge;”46 “meet the standards of the
State educational agency;”47 and “include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the
State involved.”48 Finally, most relevant to this Comment, the
statute defines a FAPE as special education and related services
“provided in conformity with the individualized education
program.”49
An IEP is a written statement that forms “the centerpiece of
the statute’s education delivery system” of that FAPE “for disabled children.”50 At a high level, an IEP must contain “a statement
of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” “a statement of measurable annual goals,”
“a description of how the child’s progress . . . will be measured,”
and “a statement of the special education and related services . . .
that will be provided.”51 An IEP is prepared by an IEP team,
which includes teachers, school officials, and the parents of the
child.52 The statute also lists factors that the IEP team “shall consider” in formulating the plan.53 In general, the IEP team must
consider “the strengths of the child”; “the concerns of the parents
for enhancing the education of their child”; “the results of the initial evaluation or most recent evaluation of the child”; and “the
academic, developmental, and functional needs of the child.”54
The procedures governing the creation of the IEP heavily
“emphasize collaboration among parents and educators and require careful consideration of the child’s individual circumstances.”55 In fact, “Congress ‘took a number of the procedural
safeguards from PARC and Mills and wrote them directly into the
45

20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A).
47 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B).
48 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(C).
49 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D).
50 Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
51 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
52 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
53 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)–(B).
54 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A).
55 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE–1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
994 (2017).
46
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[IDEA].’” 56 Further, one of the primary functions of the 1997
amendments to the IDEA was to increase the parents’ role in the
IEP process.57 The Supreme Court observed in Schaffer v. Weast58
that “[t]he core of the statute [ ] is the cooperative process that it
establishes between parents and schools.”59 Although “[p]arents
and educators often agree about what a child’s IEP should contain,”60 the IDEA provides “‘procedural safeguards’ to protect disabled children and their parents”61 in the event of disagreements.
Among them is a “graduated set of dispute resolution mechanisms: informal meetings, formal mediation, a ‘due process hearing’ before a state or local administrative agency, and, if necessary, judicial review.”62
The IDEA also provides procedures for modifications of an
IEP. The IDEA requires at least annual review of an IEP “to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being
achieved” and revisions “as appropriate to address” issues such
as “any lack of expected progress,” “information about the child
provided to, or by, the parents,” and “other matters.”63 If a school
district wishes to change a student’s IEP outside of the annual
review, then it is required to provide advanced written notice to
the parents, who then have an opportunity to make known any
concerns and objections or file a complaint about the changes.64
Altering an IEP need not be an especially onerous process. If a
school has held the required yearly IEP meeting but further
changes are desired, “the parent of a child with a disability and
the local educational agency may agree not to convene an IEP
meeting for the purposes of making such changes, and instead
may develop a written document to amend or modify the child’s
current IEP.”65

56 Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 58 (2005) (quoting Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449,
455 (2004)).
57 See, e.g., Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 189, 214–15.
58 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
59 Id. at 53 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06).
60 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994.
61 L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd., 927 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 1415).
62 Id.
63 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A).
64 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(i) (2021).
65 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(D); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(i).
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C. Courts Grapple with the Meaning of a FAPE
Immediately after the passage of IDEA, confusion arose as to
whether the law provided a substantive right to an education beyond mandating compliance with the detailed procedures. The
Supreme Court soon answered that question in the affirmative.
In Board of Education v. Rowley,66 the Court held that, by requiring schools to provide a FAPE, the IDEA created a substantive
entitlement to “specialized instruction and related services which
are individually designed to provide educational benefit.”67 In
other words, the school must provide enough support to “permit
the child to benefit educationally from [the] instruction.”68
The more challenging task, the Rowley Court noted, is defining the contours of this substantive right—in other words, determining when “handicapped children are receiving sufficient
educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act.”69 The
Court explicitly declined to answer this question.70 The Court held
only that “the furnishing of every special service necessary to
maximize each handicapped child’s potential is . . . further than
Congress intended to go.”71 Between any benefit and maximal
benefit, however, there is obviously a broad range.
The Supreme Court recently revisited this question in Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE–1.72 Its
66

458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Id. at 201.
68 Id. at 203.
69 Id. at 202. The Rowley Court used the phrase “handicapped children,” reflecting
the language of the statute before it was amended to use the phrase “individuals with
disabilities.” See supra note 36. For a discussion of how the language of disability has
evolved in U.S. legal history, see Meg E. Ziegler, Disabling Language: Why Legal Terminology Should Comport with a Social Model of Disability, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1183, 1187–
1202 (2020).
67

The term “handicap” . . . began to fall out of favor with the disability community
in the mid-1980s because of its association with negative stereotypes. The word
was replaced with “disability,” and while the two words have been and continue
to be used interchangeably, they have distinct definitions. A “disability” is a condition of an individual, while a “handicap” is a restriction or disadvantage, often
the result of society, that hinders one’s ability to function. “Handicapped” was
no longer an acceptable label for people with disabilities, but it was still used
sparingly in professional literature to describe barriers to access.
Id. at 1199.
70 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 (“Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and
who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we
confine our analysis to that situation.”).
71 Id. at 199.
72 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
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decision created the “Endrew F. standard”: in order “[t]o meet its
substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an
IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”73 This standard
incorporates a few notable principles. First, the standard focuses
on reasonable calculation rather than actual educational outcomes. The “reasonably calculated” qualification reflects a “recognition that crafting an appropriate program of education requires
a prospective judgment by school officials.”74 The Court found additional comfort in this qualification given that the “fact-intensive
exercise” of crafting an IEP “will be informed not only by the expertise of school officials, but also by the input of the child’s
parents or guardians.”75 In other words, the Court’s respect for
the forward-looking judgment calls made by school officials in
forming IEPs is partially justified by the involvement of parents
in the IEP-formation process. The Endrew F. standard also emphasizes the individualization of IEPs. Endrew F. replaced Rowley’s inquiry about whether the child received sufficient “benefit”
with a focus on “appropriate progress.”76 The Court said that this
focus on individualization “should come as no surprise,” because
“[a] focus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA.”77
The Endrew F. Court also provided important analysis about
how and when courts should defer to school officials in the context
of defining a FAPE. The Court noted that “deference is based on
the application of expertise and the exercise of judgment by school
authorities.”78 Given “[t]he nature of the IEP process, from the initial consultation through state administrative proceedings,”
school authorities will have had ample opportunity to consider
the disagreements over the content of the IEP (including the “degree of progress a child’s IEP should pursue”).79 By the time of
judicial review, then, “[a] reviewing court may fairly expect those
authorities to be able to offer a cogent and responsive explanation
for their decisions that shows the IEP” meets Endrew F.’s substantive standard.80

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
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D. Implementation of the IEP
The IDEA establishes both procedural and substantive entitlements, and these entitlements center around the IEP. Students have a right to a plan created in compliance with the statutory process and subject to extensive procedural safeguards.
Under Endrew F., the plan must be reasonably calculated to enable them to make appropriate progress given their circumstances.
Those rights give rise to a closely related but distinct right:
the right to the implementation of that plan. In failure-toimplement cases, “the parent [ ] argue[s] that while their child’s
IEP clears [the] IDEA’s substantive threshold as written, the
school has nonetheless failed to properly put the plan into practice.”81 For example, what if an IEP calls for fifteen hours of
speech therapy a week, and the student is provided only five
hours a week? What if the student is provided fifteen hours most
weeks but none other weeks? Similarly, is some other
communication-related therapy sufficient? Especially given the
level of detail involved in IEPs, the key question becomes: How
far can the school stray from an IEP’s written terms before it has
violated the IDEA? Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
spoken directly to this question.
There are two legal bases for concluding that an implementation failure is a violation of the IDEA. First, a failure to implement an IEP could be a denial of a FAPE because it violates the
Rowley and Endrew F. requirements that a certain quality of education be offered to children with disabilities. Parents making
such a claim would argue that the IEP as implemented does not
satisfy Endrew F.’s standard, even if the IEP as written does. For
example, if the school offered an IEP that was close to the minimum amount required under law and it failed to implement some
of what was included in the IEP, then it might not be providing
an education reasonably calculated to enable the child to make
appropriate progress.
The second legal basis is § 1401(9)(D) of the IDEA, the fourth
prong of the statutory definition of a FAPE: “The term ‘free appropriate public education’ means special education and related
services that . . . are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.”82 This provision gives effect to the
IDEA’s approach of protecting students through parental
81
82

L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis in original).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (emphasis added).
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involvement and procedural rights. In summary, a student is entitled to educational services of a certain quality under Supreme
Court precedent, and a student is entitled to services that are “in
conformity with” the IEP pursuant to § 1401(9)(D).
Finally, a word on remedies for failure-to-implement claims.
When a school district fails to provide a FAPE, it can be obligated
to reimburse the student’s family for appropriate private educational services obtained in the interim.83 Similarly, if the parents
did not seek out replacement services, school districts can be responsible for providing compensatory services.84 The prevailing
party in an IDEA suit can also receive attorneys’ fees and costs.85
Failure-to-implement cases are no exception. Even when the
school is merely ordered to rectify the failure, it “amounts to actual relief on the merits” and entitles parents to attorneys’ fees.86
II. EXISTING APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
This Part explores both of the recognized approaches to failure-to-implement cases: materiality and per se. Part II.A starts
by identifying the meaning of materiality as it has been articulated by several federal appellate courts. It also explores the reasoning that those courts used in adopting the materiality standard. Afterward, it considers various theories of what a materiality
inquiry might entail in the implementation context. Then it digs
into the application of materiality to several actual cases. In doing
so, this Section demonstrates the unpredictability and unworkability of this approach. Part II.A concludes with several additional
arguments against materiality, including its circumvention of the
IDEA’s procedural protections, its incentivization of overpromising and underdelivering on IEPs, and its tension with Supreme
Court precedent about the meaning of a FAPE. Part II.B then
turns to the per se test and explain why it is a problematic alternative. The per se test is too inflexible, does not distinguish
between better and worse responses to unavoidable or unforeseen
circumstances, and incentivizes schools to create IEPs that promise as little as possible.

83
84
85
86

Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009).
G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir. 2003).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003).

2022]

In Need of Better Material

1035

A. The Materiality Standard
All federal circuit courts that have ruled on the proper approach to failure-to-implement cases have articulated a materiality standard. But the content, contours, and application of the
standard vary across circuits and cases. This Section digs into the
different formulations and applications of the materiality standard, demonstrating its unworkability. This Section also explores
the reasoning that courts employed in adopting the materiality
standard.
1. Adopting materiality.
The materiality standard was first adopted, in 2000, by the
Fifth Circuit in Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R.87
The court drew on its established four-factor approach to substantive claims alleging that a FAPE has been denied under the
IDEA—an operationalization of Rowley that weaves together elements related to content and implementation.88 The first two factors are related to IEP content.89 The third factor considers
whether “the services are provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders.’” 90 The fourth factor examines the benefit that the child actually received from the
education.91
The court concluded that to successfully challenge an IEP’s
implementation, plaintiffs “must show more than a de minimis
failure to implement all elements of that IEP.”92 The court explained that a FAPE has been provided if “substantial or significant provisions of the IEP” were followed.93 In deriving this approach from the third and fourth factors, the Fifth Circuit
asserted that materiality is a “reasonable” standard given “Rowley’s flexible approach.”94 The court elaborated that the approach
strikes a proper balance: it “affords local agencies some flexibility
in implementing IEP’s, but it still holds those agencies

87

200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 346–48 (citing Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel.
Barry F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997)).
89 Id. at 347 (focusing on the individualization of the IEP and the student’s placement
in the least restrictive environment).
90 Id. at 347–48 (citing Cypress-Fairbanks, 118 F.3d at 253).
91 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 347–49.
92 Id. at 349.
93 Id.
94 Id.
88
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accountable for material failures and for providing the disabled
child a meaningful educational benefit.”95
As other federal circuit courts confronted implementation
cases, they drew heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Bobby
R. For example, in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark,96 the
Eighth Circuit derived from Rowley the conclusion “that an IEP
is [not] reasonably calculated to provide a [FAPE] if there is evidence that the school actually failed to implement an essential
element of the IEP that was necessary for the child to receive an
educational benefit.”97 Years later, the Fourth Circuit held, in
Sumter County School District 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. T.H.,98 that
“a failure to implement a material portion of an IEP[ ] violates
the IDEA.”99 The court also asserted that this standard follows
from Rowley.100
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit entered the implementation fray
in Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker School District 5J101 and
used similar language.102 The court in Van Duyn held that a failure to implement an IEP is a violation of the IDEA only if the
school district “is shown to have materially failed to implement
the child’s IEP.”103 The court elaborated: “A material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discrepancy between the
services provided to a disabled child and those required by the
IEP.”104 The court also considered how the actual benefit to the
child should fit into the analysis, “clarify[ing] that the materiality
95

Id.
315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003).
97 Id. at 1027 n.3. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit stated in a footnote that it was
not adopting the Bobby R. analysis, despite it “more accurately suit[ing] the posture of
th[e] case,” because the parties did not argue for it. Id. However, it’s a bit difficult to tell
if there’s any daylight between the two approaches. The facts of the case were relatively
straightforward: the student’s IEP called for a behavior-management plan, behavior management was clearly a primary goal of the IEP, the school did not develop or implement a
behavior-management plan, and behavioral issues resulted in the student losing any benefit from the rest of the IEP. Thus, the court held that the implementation failure violated
the IDEA. Id. at 1030.
98 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011).
99 Id. at 484.
100 Id. at 483. The facts of this case were straightforward as well, so its application
tells us little more about the functioning of the materiality standard. The IEP “called for
15 hours per week of applied behavioral analysis therapy (‘ABA’) therapy,” but the student
was only provided 7.5–10 hours per week of that therapy, and testimony clearly established that the therapy was provided incorrectly. Id. at 481, 484–85.
101 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
102 Id. at 815, 822.
103 Id. at 815.
104 Id.
96
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standard does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail,” but “the child’s educational
progress, or lack of it, may be probative of whether there has been
more than a minor shortfall.”105
The Ninth Circuit offered a more robust set of justifications
for the materiality approach.106 The Van Duyn court drew heavily
on Rowley, as other circuits had before, but it provided a more
detailed explanation of how Rowley’s reasoning militated in favor
of materiality. However, the extensions of Rowley into the implementation context are somewhat flawed. First, the court reasoned
that—because Rowley held that “procedural flaws in an IEP’s formulation do not automatically violate the IDEA, but rather do so
only when the resulting IEP” is inadequate107—“minor failures” in
IEP implementation should “not automatically be treated as violations of the statute.”108 However, the Ninth Circuit did not explain why the Supreme Court’s flexible treatment of procedural
violations ought to extend to substantive violations. In theory,
Rowley might have been more permissive of procedural failings
because the output of the procedures (the IEP and the education
itself) could be reviewed on their own merits by administrative
officers and courts. Additionally, elsewhere in the Van Duyn opinion, the majority rejected an argument that implementation failures should be treated like procedural violations: “[T]here is no
indication that a conflation of this sort is intended or permitted
105

Id. at 822.
The case also included a vehement dissenting opinion, discussed in Part II.B,
which rejected the materiality standard and argued for a per se test. See Van Duyn, 502
F.3d at 826–29 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Much of the academic literature on implementation was published in response to and immediately following Van Duyn. See, e.g., Elexis
Reed, Casenote, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—The Ninth Circuit Determines That Only a Material Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Violates the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 61 SMU L. REV. 495, 498–99 (2008)
(“Indeed, the majority established the incorrect standard for assessing an IEP’s implementation. The dissent correctly identified the flaws in the majority’s ‘materiality’ standard
and applied the proper standard for assessing the implementation of IEPs—failure to implement any portion of an IEP violates the IDEA.” (emphasis omitted) (citing Van Duyn,
502 F.3d at 829 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)); David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a
School’s Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a Free and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 100–03 (2009)
(arguing that the per se rule is most consistent with the purposes of the IDEA); David G.
King, Note, Van Duyn v. Baker School District: A “Material” Improvement in Evaluating
a School District’s Failure to Implement Individualized Education Programs, 4 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 457, 479–86 (2009) (arguing that materiality is a generally workable and desirable standard, despite some flaws in the majority’s reasoning).
107 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
108 Id.
106
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by the statute.”109 In other words, the court acknowledged that
implementation is part of the substantive right and ought not be
treated as a procedural failing, but it then justified its implementation approach by pointing to the Rowley’s treatment of
procedural flaws.
The Ninth Circuit extended Rowley in another troubling way.
The court stated that Rowley’s “description of the IDEA’s purpose
as providing a ‘basic floor of opportunity’ to disabled students rather than a ‘potential-maximizing education’ also supports granting some flexibility to school districts charged with implementing
IEPs.”110 But even if Rowley set the substantive bar for content
well below potential-maximizing, there’s no reason that the implementation bar should be similarly permissive. There is also no
suggestion that providing every service that the school said it
would provide would be potential maximizing.
Finally, beyond extending Rowley, the Ninth Circuit was also
the first circuit court to invoke the “in conformity with” language
of § 1401(9)(D), part of the statutory definition of a FAPE. The
court concluded that the phrase “counsels against making minor
implementation failures actionable” and that “[t]here is no statutory requirement of perfect adherence to the IEP.”111 Ultimately,
Van Duyn used precedent and statutory language to argue for
some flexibility when schools implement IEPs. It did not, however, justify why or how this need for some amount of flexibility
necessitates a materiality standard. Nor did it sufficiently grapple with the relationship between substantive challenges—including both IEP content and IEP implementation—and procedural ones.
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided Endrew F., providing another touchpoint for courts grappling with the implementation
issue. The Eleventh Circuit did not confront a failure-toimplement case until after Endrew F. In a long and thoughtful
opinion in L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. School Board,112 the Eleventh Circuit also determined that “a material deviation from [the IEP] violates the statute.”113 The court elaborated that “[a] material implementation failure occurs only when a school has failed to
implement substantial or significant provisions of a child’s
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 819.
Id. at 821 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21, 201).
Id.
927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1206.
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IEP.”114 The opinion clarified that “courts must consider implementation failures both quantitatively and qualitatively to determine how much was withheld and how important the withheld
services were in view of the IEP as a whole.”115 Further, citing Van
Duyn, L.J. treated “actual educational progress (or lack thereof)”
as useful evidence but not dispositive.116 In particular, the court
expressed concern about holding school districts responsible for a
lack of progress without a showing of a link to the “specific implementation failure.”117
In interpreting the “in conformity with” language of
§ 1401(9)(D), the Eleventh Circuit brought dictionary definitions
to the debate: “‘Conformity’ means ‘[c]orrespondence in form,
manner, or use; agreement; harmony; congruity.’” 118 On the other
hand, “[c]onspicuously absent from this definition are words like
‘exact’ or ‘identical,’ suggesting that the IDEA recognizes that
some degree of flexibility is necessary in implementing a child’s
IEP.”119 It’s worth noting, however, that at least one commentator
identified an alternative dictionary definition pointing in the opposite direction: the Oxford English Dictionary defines “conformity” as “exact correspondence to or with a pattern.”120
Beyond definitions, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to other
“contextual clue[s]” supporting flexibility.121 For example, in certain circumstances, a dispute may be over “a child’s old IEP that
a school district is required to implement during the pendency of
disputes over the content of a new one,” sometimes referred to as
a “stay-put” IEP.122 In such instances,
[a]n old IEP may quite literally be impossible to fully implement in a new setting. . . . [I]t would be odd—and again, often
impossible—for the IDEA to demand blind compliance with
an out-of-date IEP in an educational context that it was not
114

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1214 (emphasis in original).
116 Id.
117 L.J., 927 F.3d at 1214.
118 Id. at 1212 (alteration in original) (citing Conformity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(6th ed. 1991)).
119 Id.
120 Madeline E. Smith, Note, The Eleventh Circuit Permits Schools to Submit Unfinished Homework in L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. School Board of Broward County by Requiring
Only “Material” Implementation of IEPs for Students with Disabilities, 65 VILL. L. REV.
451, 472 (2020) (quoting Conformity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis in original)).
121 L.J., 927 F.3d at 1213.
122 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).
115
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designed for and in which it cannot be carried out in its
entirety.123
The opinion also noted that the IDEA recognizes that children
develop quickly and that their needs “do not remain static,” but
the statute requires only annual review of the IEP.124 From this,
the court concluded that “IEPs have some amount of flex in their
joints with an expectation that parents and schools will work together to keep the plans up to date as circumstances and the
child’s needs demand.”125 Although perhaps not giving enough visibility to the revision procedures of the IDEA, which permit
changes outside the annual structure and even allow them to be
made in writing without calling another IEP-team meeting,126 it
is true that circumstances will sometimes change faster than IEP
revisions can be made.
The biggest issue with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning
echoes the above critique of the Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s approach: the need for some flexibility does not go all the way to
justifying materiality. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged this,
framing its arguments as responses to “the alternative to a materiality standard—holding that any deviation, however minor,
necessarily and conclusively amounts to an IDEA violation.”127
However, if another viable approach that allowed the school flexibility were on the table, this reasoning would do little to justify
the materiality standard.
Finally, the L.J. court addressed Endrew F.’s relevance to implementation challenges. The court asserted that the “presumptively valid IEP” “stands in as a proxy for Endrew F.’s substantive
threshold,” and reviewing courts are left only to determine
whether the implementation was “in conformity with” the IEP.128
Under this theory, Endrew F. and Rowley do not establish the educational quality that a child is actually due but only the educational quality that the school must offer in the content of the plan.
Thus, even if a plan would barely survive an Endrew F. inquiry,
a school is afforded flexibility to deviate from it without facing
scrutiny into the absolute quality of the resulting education. This
articulation is understandable: the Endrew F. standard speaks
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id. at 1212.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(D); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(i).
L.J., 927 F.3d at 1213.
Id. at 1216.
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only in terms of IEP content.129 However, that should not be read
to cut IEP implementation off from the substantive guarantees of
this line of cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described
the substantive right in terms of the education itself, not merely
the text of the IEP. For example, in Honig v. Doe,130 the Court
noted that the law “confers upon disabled students an enforceable
substantive right to public education in participating States.”131
Additionally, the Rowley Court described the entitlement in
terms of the student actually receiving education and related services.132 The Endrew F. Court articulated a standard for evaluating content cases because Endrew F. was a content case providing
valuable analysis about the contours of the broader substantive
right.
The materiality standard emerged in response to courts’ perception that flexibility is a necessary part of IEP implementation.
This perceived need for flexibility arose out of aspects of the statutory scheme and a general sense of the practicalities of educating children with disabilities. Courts also considered the relevance of Rowley and Endrew F., looking at both the way that
those cases defined the underlying substantive right and the approach that the Court took to the IDEA. Several circuits concluded that the cases supported a flexible implementation approach. Finally, courts contemplated the meaning of “in
conformity with,” ultimately using dictionary definitions. As this
Section draws out, none of these rationales is without its flaws.
The extensions of Supreme Court precedent into the implementation realm are sometimes hard to follow. But more fundamentally, the need for flexibility that animates the doctrine doesn’t
point directly to materiality. Instead, it counsels rejection of the
only live alternative, a rigid per se approach to liability.133 The
next Section turns from conceptual issues with materiality to
practical ones, arguing that the standard is applied to the
varied facts of failure-to-implement cases unpredictably and
inconsistently.
129 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA,
a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
130 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
131 Id. at 310.
132 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (holding that the IDEA created a substantive entitlement
to “specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide
educational benefit”).
133 See infra Part II.B.
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2. Applying materiality.
Considerable difficulties emerge when applying a materiality
standard in failure-to-implement cases. There are several possible ways to consider whether an implementation failure was material. First, a court could look holistically at the IEP, comparing
the implemented services to the denied services and determining
whether the difference is material. In theory, this seems sensible.
In practice, thorny questions quickly emerge: Should the court
simply add up the number of hours or the number of IEP provisions? Or should it make a more qualitative judgment?134 What if
some provisions are only partially fulfilled? What if some services
are more integral to the success of the IEP, more important to the
child’s parents, or more expensive or time-consuming?
Perhaps this points to a second understanding of materiality:
evaluating implementation provision by provision. Courts can assess which provisions are most important for the child’s progress,
deem them “significant” or “substantial,” and hold schools liable
for violating only those provisions (excusing violation, then, of
provisions deemed immaterial). This seems to tie the inquiry
closer to the child’s educational progress. Again, however, uncertainty abounds. In addition to the questions above, how does a
court decide which provisions included in the IEP by the school
and the parents are the important ones? Can the various provisions even be meaningfully differentiated? Arguably, IEPs are indivisible—the provisions are meant to work together in complex
ways.135 Why would an IEP contain provisions that courts will not
(or are very unlikely to) enforce? Further, if a provision is partially met, or a substitute is provided, how should that count?136

134 For example, in Turner v. District of Columbia, 952 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2013),
the court noted that the focus of an implementation inquiry is “on the proportion of services mandated to those actually provided, and the goal and import (as articulated in the
IEP) of the specific service that was withheld.” Id. at 40 (emphasis in original). The court
elaborated on this approach by exploring how many hours of difference between what was
promised and what was provided constituted a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 41. Another court
directly ran the numbers: “Since [the school] failed to provide 83% of the required services,
it cannot be seriously argued that its failure to implement the IEP was de minimis.” Holman v. District of Columbia, 153 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (D.D.C. 2016).
135 See Perry A. Zirkel, Failure to Implement the IEP: The Third Dimension of FAPE
Under the IDEA, 28 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 174, 175 (2017).
136 Courts applying this understanding sometimes find the offered compensatory services to be inadequate. See, e.g., Turner, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 41. One court concluded that
“[p]roviding more hours outside of general education is [ ] not an acceptable alternative
for supported hours inside the general education environment.” Id. Similarly, that court
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Finally, courts could assess the materiality of implementation failures by looking at the educational progress that the child
actually made. This inquiry is also problematic. What if the student makes progress toward some of the IEP’s goals but not others? How much actual progress is enough? On the other hand, if
a student does not make progress, it is possible that this happened because of circumstances unrelated to the implementation
failures. For example, perhaps the overall plan was not a good fit.
Each conception of materiality, on its own, provides little
guidance. The confusion is only amplified by courts invoking multiple of these understandings. The next sections explore how
courts have applied the materiality inquiry in practice,
demonstrating that these thorny questions arise in reality as well
as in theory. The unpredictability leaves parents and schools with
insufficient guidance.
a) Bobby R. Caius R. was a child with dyslexia and attention deficit disorder.137 Multiple implementation failures were alleged. First, his third-grade IEP called for “one hour of speech
therapy per week.”138 However, from January to May 1995, the
elementary school did not have a speech therapist, resulting in a
denial of approximately sixteen hours of speech therapy.139 Instead, Caius received twenty-five hours of compensatory speech
therapy over the summer.140 Second, Caius’s sixth-grade IEP included a number of modifications, including highlighted and
taped texts.141 These were not provided consistently.142 Finally,
following Caius’s parents’ realization that he “learned more
readily when information was presented in a multisensory fashion,” Caius’s IEP called for him to be taught with an alphabeticphonics (AP) program.143 No teacher at the school, however, was
trained in AP techniques, and the school had difficulty finding an
AP teacher, so Caius went without AP programming for two
months.144 The school offered “compensatory AP services” until it

rejected the argument that a “paraprofessional in special education” could stand in for a
“special education assistant.” Id. at 41–42.
137 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 343.
138 Id. at 344.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 348.
143 Id. at 344.
144 Id.
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could hire a teacher, and Caius’s parents refused.145 The implementation failures had a real impact: Caius progressed slower
than he would have with AP training, and “his progress in word
attack skills was de minimis.”146
The Fifth Circuit held, however, that these deviations from
the IEP were not material, and thus they were not violations of
the IDEA.147 It embraced the district court’s assertion that “local
school agencies should retain some flexibility in scheduling services and, when necessary, providing compensatory services,”148
allowing the school district to make adjustments to when services
should be provided as long as the quantity of the services is unchanged.149 The court seems to have determined, then, that at
least some IEP specifications regarding the timing of services are
immaterial, even when the student was denied a benefit that the
IEP was designed to confer and where potentially important provisions were not followed as written. While Bobby R. could be read
to give schools carte blanche to create timelines for the provision
of services during the IEP process and then abandon them without fear of liability, it seems more likely that there is a point at
which the Fifth Circuit’s approach would deem a rescheduling of
services a material violation. The opinion provides little guidance
about where that line might or ought to be drawn.
In this case, the court simply assumed that the subsequent
services, provided all at once rather than gradually, were a sufficient substitute within a reasonable window of flexibility and
timeline adjustment. That assumption is intuitively suspect,
however. Imagine telling an athlete with a knee injury that, as
opposed to receiving an hour of physical therapy every week for
five months, she would instead receive thirty hours the subsequent summer. Not only could she not benefit from the therapy
for a substantial portion of the year, likely impacting her ability
to practice and develop other skills in the meantime, but there is
also a good case that the therapy would be less effective when
delivered all at once. The fact that she was overcompensated in
terms of hours does little to alleviate these concerns. The opinion
acknowledged neither concern, underscoring an issue with generalist judges drawing conclusions about the materiality of special
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 348.
Id. at 350.
Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 350.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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education and related services. This also highlights the difficulty
of assessing the significance of individual provisions to the efficacy of the educational scheme as a whole, as the materiality
standard calls for. Perhaps a test calibrated to the appropriate
level of flexibility in timing, rather than one based on the importance of the timing, would help address these issues.
b) Spring Branch. Almost two decades after Bobby R., the
Fifth Circuit heard another failure-to-implement claim in Spring
Branch Independent School District v. O.W. ex rel. Hannah W.150
O.W. was a child with “poor emotional and behavioral regulation.”151 Before the IEP at issue had been formulated, O.W. had
engaged in violent and disruptive behavior, including “climbing
the walls of the gym” and “assault[ing] his fifth-grade teacher.”152
O.W.’s IEP had an extended section on discipline. In response
to physical aggression, staff were instructed to use several tactics,
including “help[ing] O.W. learn replacement behaviors (e.g., removing himself to a cooling-off area, implementing deep breathing, calming sequences, stop and think)” and “avoid[ing]
power struggles and arguments, and instead offer choices,
frequent/movement breaks, and access to preferred activities.”153
Yet in response to physical aggression from O.W., the school “used
restraints, time-outs, and police intervention.”154
The Fifth Circuit found that the use of time-outs violated the
IDEA. They were prohibited by the IEP because they were not
included in the list of approved tactics, and thus “the recurrent
use . . . amounted to a substantial or significant departure from
the IEP.”155 Further, “O.W.’s grades dropped and his behavior deteriorated” after these tactics were implemented.156 Given both
the significance of the failure and O.W.’s regression, the court
found that the time-out discipline was an “actionable failure to
implement.”157 It is unclear after Spring Branch, however,
whether either regression or a significant departure from the IEP
alone would be sufficient to carry a failure-to-implement claim.

150

961 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 787.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 788 (quoting Spring Branch Indep. Sch. v. O.W., No. 16-CV-2643, 2018 WL
2335341, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018)).
154 Id. at 789.
155 Spring Branch, 961 F.3d at 797.
156 Id.
157 Id.
151
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The Fifth Circuit found that the physical restraints and police intervention, however, were not material failures. The court
reasoned that because Texas law allowed for physical restraints
in emergency situations and the IEP did not explicitly state that
the strategies for physical aggression applied in such situations,
the tactics were permissible when “the school determined the restraint was necessary to prevent serious physical harm to O.W.
or to another” and after “attempts by district staff to utilize at
least some of the strategies enumerated in the IEP.”158 Similar
reasoning was applied to the police intervention.159 It is striking,
given O.W.’s history, that the IEP did not explicitly address or
define emergency situations, and it is unclear if O.W.’s parents
were aware that the IEP did not apply in such emergencies.
Ultimately, the court appeared to condone a significant deviation from the IEP because it was not convinced that the school
had an alternative—but this has nothing to do with materiality.
If the potential unavoidability of the deviation is the relevant
question, the analysis would be more effective and honest if the
court had focused on and heard evidence related to that inquiry
as opposed to forcing it into the materiality framework.
c) Van Duyn. Van Duyn was a thirteen-year-old “severely
autistic boy,” and “a “team comprised of teachers, district representatives and Van Duyn’s mother finalized a comprehensive IEP
for the 2001-02 school year.”160 Van Duyn transitioned from elementary school to middle school in that year. The IEP was quite
detailed, but many of the services that it included were provided
improperly, inconsistently, or not at all.
First, the IEP called for a full-time “behavior management
plan,” which included “a daily behavior card, a visual schedule,
social stories and a quiet room.”161 However, Van Duyn’s “behavior was not accurately recorded on the card, he did not set up his
daily schedule before starting each school day, social stories were
not properly used and he was not ordered to go to the quiet room
after all incidents of misbehavior.”162 Next, “the IEP required the
regional autism specialist to visit the middle school twice per
week,” but the regional consultant visited “a dozen times over the
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Id. at 798.
Id.
160 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 815.
161 Id. at 815–16. For more about social stories, see What Is a Social Story, CAROL
GRAY SOC. STORIES, https://perma.cc/B33M-8X2K.
162 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 816.
159
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first three months,” and “other autism consultants also came by
with some regularity.”163 Additionally, the IEP stated that Van
Duyn’s aide was to “receive state autism training,” but she “did
not receive state-level training in educating autistic children.”164
Instead, she “attend[ed] local autism classes and [met] with individuals who had worked with him in the past.”165 Further, the IEP
stated that “progress was to be measured by quarterly report
cards, and approximately 70 short-term objectives corresponding
to a series of annual goals were to be pursued.”166 However, Van
Duyn’s quarterly report cards only partially corresponded to the
IEP’s goals, and he “worked toward many but not all of the shortterm objectives set out in the IEP. For example, he did not participate in any telephone activities or write a daily note home” for
much of the IEP period.167
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the failures were
immaterial because many of the techniques were actually used by
the school, “even if not quite as Van Duyn envisioned.”168 The
court further reasoned that certain elements of the IEP, which
bore substantial similarities to his elementary school IEP, were
inappropriate for the middle school context if implemented as
they had been at his previous school.169 Finally, the court noted
that Van Duyn had made some educational progress in areas related to the implementation failures.170
A few aspects of the application are worth highlighting. First,
there appears to have been a critical misunderstanding between
the school and the parents as to the meaning of the IEP’s terms,
and the materiality standard allowed that misunderstanding to
be resolved in the school’s favor. In doing so, the court rejected
the notion that the IEP be interpreted as a contract and against
the drafter.171 If one party understands a behavior-management
plan to include four different things and one party understands it
to include only two different things, then it is unclear why an interpreter should prefer the latter merely because it is narrower.
This approach devalues the parents as parties whose meaningful
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 816.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
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and informed participation in the process and consent to the IEP
are crucial. It also incentivizes broad or unclear language. When
adapting the provisions to the middle school context, the school
could have specified how the provisions would be implemented or
written down the bounds of the flexibility.
Second, assessing materiality through after-the-fact judgments about the student’s educational progress is a fraught task.
Courts are left trying to make sense of markers of progress that
may not be relevant because of the very implementation failures
alleged. For example, the court used Van Duyn’s report cards as
evidence that he had improved “in the vast majority of categories”
despite having previously noted that one of the implementation
failures was a lack of correspondence between the report cards
and the IEP’s goals.172 As additional evidence that Van Duyn’s behavior had improved, the court pointed to the fact that he was
sent to the quiet room for bad behavior far less frequently than in
previous years. However, one of the implementation failures was
teachers not sending Van Duyn to the quiet room for misbehavior
every time, unlike the practice from prior years. These disjunctures highlight the difficulty of incorporating benefit to the student into the materiality approach.
Finally, the facts show that the school district systemically
overpromised in the IEP, and the materiality standard excused
it. Overpromising prevents parents from bringing challenges on
the front end: The overpromised IEP would offer enough to presumably sail past a Rowley–Endrew F. inquiry. If the IEP had
reflected a realistic assessment of what the school would provide,
then the parents could have expressed their concerns or raised
administrative or legal challenges to the content, and the IEP
would have been assessed for substantive adequacy. Any issues
could then have been resolved before the student had experienced
a loss and before the need arose to judge the adequacy of compensatory services.
Further, overpromising forecloses parents’ ability to advocate
for or negotiate toward the services that they consider most important. Consider a hypothetical: During an IEP formation, a
school admitted that it didn’t have a properly equipped quiet
room. School officials could have suggested an alternative and explained why they did not believe it was necessary in middle
school, or they could have provided a timeline to add a quiet room
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and included it in the IEP. Returning to Van Duyn, his mother
could have decided how important she thought the quiet room
was, perhaps saying that she would rather have it than some of
the other IEP services or noting that the quiet room was not necessary as long as Van Duyn received some other provision. Such
advocating cannot happen when the school adds provisions that
it cannot or is not planning to meet.
3. Additional issues with materiality.
In his dissent in Van Duyn, Judge Warren Ferguson summarized many of the problems with the materiality standard that
have been demonstrated above. In addition to the issues raised
above, three more objections are found in his dissent: materiality
undermines the IDEA’s procedural requirements, forces judges
outside their areas of expertise, and is vague and unworkable.
Further, materiality has several points of inconsistency with Endrew F. This Section highlights and elaborates on those points
and explore some additional concerns.
First, the materiality inquiry allows school districts to circumvent the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Judge Ferguson made the objection clear: “[A]llowing the school district to disregard already agreed-upon portions of the IEP would essentially
give the district license to unilaterally redefine the content of the
student’s plan by default.”173 In other words, materiality allows
schools to forgo the revision provisions of the IDEA. Endrew F.
only strengthens this argument with its emphasis on the importance of the IEP process in airing disputes, facilitating parental input and inclusion, and ensuring careful deliberation by
school officials.174 Allowing the school to disregard some amount
of what it offers creates an incentive to include additional provisions to assuage parents in negotiations without confidence about
whether they can be met. This inhibits the efficacy of content
challenges and interferes with parents’ ability to weigh in on difficult tradeoffs.
The second argument is about institutional competence.
Judge Ferguson made a general point about judicial expertise,
173 Id. at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); see also Smith, supra note 120, at 473–74 (“By
allowing for a flexible implementation of IEPs, the materiality standard gives schools the
unilateral power to make changes to the IEP when failing to implement the entire IEP.
. . . This license undermines the collaborative nature of the IEP team and ignores the parental participation provisions of the IDEA.”).
174 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
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one that should sound familiar after the foregoing discussion
about how materiality has been applied. Given their expertise
and access to information, “[j]udges are not in a position to determine which parts of an agreed-upon IEP are or are not material.”175 The various application issues identified in the materiality cases above provide further evidence on this point. As Judge
Ferguson noted, judicial review of substantive educational decisions is appropriate in the face of disagreement between the student or the student’s parents and the school officials about the
sufficiency of the IEP.176 In such cases, a third-party adjudicator
(an administrative-hearing officer or a judge) is needed.177 However, once “all parties have agreed that the content of the IEP
provides FAPE,”178 that necessity is eliminated, and judicial review involves increasingly difficult substantive judgments. For
instance, the judge is no longer comparing a prospective plan to a
legal standard but is instead considering the plan, the implementation, the actual effects, the adequacy of compensation, and
more. Further, in content challenges, courts are entitled to defer
to school officials because those officials were exercising their expert judgment in formulating the plan.179 However, in implementation cases, school officials are alleged to have abandoned their
prior judgments, and courts are left at sea.180 Finally, as Professor
Perry Zirkel has argued, an IEP is a “unitary concept, [ ] not subject to further differentiation.”181 Judges assessing materiality
would not only have to decide which elements are important on
their own but also understand how all the various pieces are
meant to fit together. For example, some provisions might function only if others are met. For all these reasons, it would be far
better for judges to avoid substantive evaluations of educational
quality.
Third, Judge Ferguson argued that the majority’s materiality
standard “suffers from vagueness.”182 This objection should ring
true after following other appellate courts’ (and subsequent

175 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting); see also Zirkel, supra
note 135, at 177.
176 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (“[D]eference is based on the application of expertise and the exercise of judgment by school authorities.”).
180 See Zirkel, supra note 135, at 174–75.
181 Id. at 177.
182 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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district courts’) attempts to make sense of the materiality inquiry
in challenging cases. It’s difficult to conclude that the current
state of the law offers much clarity or direction to schools,
parents, administrative decision makers, or courts. Judge Ferguson asked:
If an IEP requires ten hours per week of math tutoring,
would the provision of only nine hours be “more than a minor
discrepancy”? Eight hours? Seven hours? Because most IEPs
contain such quantitative requirements for special education
services, the majority’s standard will provide little guidance
in resolving these implementation issues.183
Both conceptually and in practice, materiality gives regulated
parties insufficient guidance about what will be required.
In addition to Judge Ferguson’s critiques, the reigning materiality standards are also arguably inconsistent with Endrew
F.184 Materiality allows students to be denied the quality of education that they are entitled to under Endrew F. If the IEP as
written would have been a very close call, but still sufficient, in a
content case (in other words, if it provides the substantive minimum), then essentially any deviation in implementation would
be a violation of the FAPE requirement. However, courts that ask
whether a “significant provision” has been denied (or that compare the proportion of services offered to those withheld) would
find that there had been no actionable implementation failure.
Therefore, a student could receive less than what they are entitled to under Endrew F. and yet have no legal recourse in a content or implementation challenge. Additionally, many circuits derived their materiality standard from the FAPE tests that they
developed after Rowley, but Endrew F. established a standard
“markedly more demanding” than many circuits’ FAPE tests.185
183

Id.
See Smith, supra note 120 at 466–70 (critiquing the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of
materiality as inconsistent with Endrew F.); see also id. at 469–70:
184

If the Supreme Court demanded more than “some” educational benefit in the
written content of IEPs, it is fair to say that it would require more than “material” implementation of said IEPs. In light of the Endrew F. decision, the materiality standard as used in the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is inappropriate and
does not promote Endrew F.’s underlying principles.
185 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000; see also Smith, supra note 120, at 468–70 (arguing
that Endrew F. was meant to raise the bar for the education of children with disabilities
under the IDEA in a way that is inconsistent with the materiality approach). But see William Moran, Note, The IDEA Demands More: A Review of FAPE Litigation After Endrew
F., 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 513–15 (2020) (concluding, based on an empirical
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For example, the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits had all
followed a “some benefit” standard, similar to the one rejected in
Endrew F.186
Additionally, Endrew F. emphasized the importance of individualization and year-to-year progress. Thus, the meaning of a
FAPE is contingent on the unique circumstances and abilities of
the child in question.187 If a school gave a child a one-size-fits-all
IEP without considering the child’s unique circumstances or an
IEP that remains static even in the face of minimal progress, then
the school likely would have failed to provide a FAPE. A reviewing court would have deemed the IEP insufficiently individualized or insufficiently responsive to enable progress. Yet certain
services that promote progress and are individualized might not
be deemed “material” under current case law.
Further, Endrew F. emphasizes that deference to school authorities is earned from their “application of expertise and [ ] exercise of judgment.”188 The materiality approach, however, gives
school authorities broad discretion outside of the process that the
IDEA provides for bringing that discretion to bear on a child’s educational program. This indicates that the importance of flexibility, derived from Rowley and emphasized in justifying materiality, might be diminished in the implementation context.
Finally, at least in the overpromising context, there’s a good argument that a plan has not been “reasonably calculated”—language in both Rowley and Endrew F.—to enable the necessary

study, that most federal courts did not consider Endrew F. to be a significant departure
from Rowley); Perry A. Zirkel, The Aftermath of Endrew F. One Year Later: An Updated
Outcomes Analysis, 352 EDUC. L. REP. 448, 450 (2018).
186 See, e.g., Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1997) (“As
long as a student is benefiting from his education, it is up to the educators to determine
the appropriate educational methodology.” (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208)); Drew P. v.
Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The state must provide the
child only with ‘a basic floor of opportunity.’” (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201)); O.S. v.
Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 360 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “some educational benefit” means “a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial”).
187 See Julie Waterstone, Endrew F.: Symbolism v. Reality, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 527,
531 (2017).
188 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001; see also Terry Jean Seligmann, Flags on the Play:
The Supreme Court Takes the Field to Enforce the Rights of Students with Disabilities, 46
J.L. & EDUC. 479, 480–81 (2017) (“[Endrew F.] makes explicit what lower courts have been
implicitly applying in assessing whether FAPE is being denied—deference to school authorities is not abdication, and evidence, not just assertions, is needed to justify deference
by courts charged with review.”).
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progress if the school has included provisions that it expects to
have difficulty meeting.189
That being said, a proponent of the materiality approach
might argue that vagueness and inconsistency with Endrew F.
aren’t inherent to a focus on materiality and that the approach
could be salvaged by the right formulation. Perhaps there is a platonic materiality inquiry, but it seems telling that federal appellate courts have yet to identify one, explain it clearly, or apply it
effectively in an edge case. More importantly, a new and improved
materiality test would address neither procedural circumvention—namely, overpromising and making de facto IEP changes
outside the IDEA’s amendment process—nor judges’ lack of expertise to make substantive judgments about which provisions
are immaterial despite being included in the IEP (the document
constructed by those with substantive expertise).
B. A Problematic Alternative—the Per Se Rule
In his Van Duyn dissent, Judge Ferguson argued for a per se
rule in materiality cases: “Given the extensive process and expertise involved in crafting an IEP, the failure to implement any portion of the program to which the school has assented is necessarily
material” and thus a violation of the IDEA.190 He excoriated the
majority for adopting a materiality standard, describing it as “inconsistent with the text of the [IDEA], inappropriate for the judiciary, and unworkably vague.”191
In the aftermath of the case, several authors have built on
the groundwork laid by Judge Ferguson and elaborated on his arguments for a per se rule.192 Courts have remained unmoved. Despite a relative consensus in the academic literature, no federal
court has embraced a per se rule.
There are several reasons why a per se rule is not a viable
alternative. The first reason is laid out effectively in the cases
above. Both the IDEA itself and the Supreme Court cases interpreting it clearly call for some amount of school flexibility,193
which the per se rule does not allow.
The per se rule is also unrealistic as a general matter. Human
error means that compliance with the written plan will not be
189
190
191
192
193

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204; Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d 826–27 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 826.
See Reed, supra note 106, at 498–99; see also Ferster, supra note 106, at 100–04.
See supra Part II.A.1.
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perfect every time. This is especially true given how long and complicated IEPs can be and how many different actors are involved
in implementing them properly. When the timing and frequency
of the services are added to the mix, the per se rule is even more
troubling: if speech therapy is missed only one week due to a
scheduling error on the school’s part, it seems quite harsh to deem
it an IEP violation even if the same therapy is provided every subsequent week. Such a scenario is far less problematic than the one
in Bobby R., where several months’ worth of weekly service were
provided over a single summer.194 But a per se rule would not distinguish between the two. Perhaps the differences could be sorted
out in damages awards, but that would require courts to wade
back into the troublesome waters of determining whether and to
what extent replacement services met the same need (thus obviating a key justification for per se over materiality).
Further, the per se rule might be unrealistic in specific contexts. A stay-put IEP—an old IEP that remains in place while a
new IEP is being challenged—is a good example.195 If a child has
changed schools or placements in the meantime, certain provisions of the old IEP might not be applicable, but the amendment
process is unavailable because the new IEP is already under contention. As the Eleventh Circuit put it, “Adopting a hair-trigger
standard for implementation cases would turn the stay-put provision into a sword rather than a shield.”196 The per se rule “fail[s]
to distinguish between schools that implement stay-put IEPs to
the fullest extent possible in a new setting and schools that simply
give up.”197
Emergency situations are another example. No amount of
planning or orderly revisions can fully account for unavoidable or
unforeseen circumstances. This is always true—it’s why contracts
contain force majeure clauses. A deadly pandemic might sweep
the country and make the former IEP impossible as schools transition online. In a more quotidian example of an unavoidable (but
nonemergency) circumstance, a speech therapist might quit unexpectedly, and an interim measure would be needed for some
time before the IEP can be revised or a new speech therapist can
be found. Either way, courts are sympathetic to school districts
dealing with unexpected or unavoidable circumstances, and that
194
195
196
197

Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 344.
See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1213.
Id.
Id.
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sympathy should be built into the proper standard. That said, a
per se rule could allow for flexibility by affording schools various
defenses to violations. Because no majority has deployed the rule,
it’s difficult to say whether courts would have expanded defenses
alongside the expanded definition of a violation. This Comment’s
proposed solution puts forward one such possibility.
There’s also an important policy objection to the per se rule:
it might result in lower-quality IEPs for children with disabilities.
Schools would be incentivized to stick as close as possible to the
minimum required by Endrew F. because any violation could lead
to liability and a lawsuit. Schools would promise less, innovate
less, and be less responsive to parents’ requests for additional services in the IEP.198 In fact, the per se rule might have the perverse
effect of pushing parents’ advocacy and their colloquies with educators out of the carefully circumscribed IEP process entirely. The
school would promise the bare minimum in the IEP, and if it later
chose to supplement that with additional services, then it would
do so outside the IDEA’s careful statutory framework. Additionally, the per se rule risks eliminating the more positive, aspirational aspects of overpromising: in some circumstances, inclusion
of a certain accommodation or service in an IEP might serve as
an impetus for the school to adopt new services, develop new infrastructure, or hire new employees.
Finally, courts are simply unlikely to adopt a per se rule.
Courts are reluctant to interfere so heavily in the provision of education, to remove discretion entirely from the school decision
makers, and to eliminate their own judicial oversight. No court
has embraced a per se rule despite all of the issues with materiality, the Van Duyn dissent, and subsequent scholarship. This is
at least some evidence that courts are unlikely to adopt the per se
rule in the future.
Courts are left in a bind. Materiality is imprecise, unworkable, and inconsistent with the IDEA’s emphasis on procedure. It
also incentivizes overpromising, brings the court outside its institutional competence, and is in tension with the Court’s analysis
in Endrew F. As highlighted in the case discussions, courts have
often justified their use of materiality, notwithstanding these
issues, by pointing to the need for some flexibility and the lack of
a viable alternative that affords it. This Comment argues for such
198 See Rachel B. Hitch, Flags on the Play?: We’re on the Same Team!, 48 J.L. & EDUC.
87, 90 (2019) (asserting that Endrew F.’s heightened standard has had little effect on the
ground because school districts don’t write IEPs “aimed at providing minimal benefit”).
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a viable alternative—a new test that would push decisions about
a student’s education back into the IEP process, divert substantive inquiries about the quality of the IEP back to content challenges, and allow flexibility where warranted.
III. A NEW APPROACH
The binary way in which courts and scholars have approached implementation cases—limiting the choice to either a
materiality standard or a per se standard—has led to an undertheorizing of the legal justifications and policy arguments in this
area. This Comment has attempted to lay out some of those complications and put the various applications of the materiality
standard in conversation both with each other and with the
broader range of factual circumstances that can arise under the
IDEA. This Comment aims to provoke a more robust discussion
and more thorough understanding of implementation cases and
the critical role that they play in the overall statutory scheme.
Specifically, this Part identifies an alternative that attempts to
resolve many of the issues with the materiality and per se standards. In addition to demonstrating the value of this proposed
standard, this analysis also highlights more generally the value
of alternatives to the prevailing approaches in this area of law.
A. The Burden-Shifting Test
This Comment’s proposed test would operate as follows.
First, the parents and child would have the burden of demonstrating the failure to implement the IEP akin to a per se violation. In
response, the school district could defend its failure to implement
the IEP by demonstrating that (1) the deviation from the IEP occurred as the result of unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances
and (2) the school’s response was proportional to the challenge
posed by the circumstances. The proportionality inquiry would
consider both the school’s efforts to revise the IEP through the
statutory processes and the provision of replacement services in
the meantime. This Section explores in further detail the operation of both steps of the test.
1. The failure to implement—a per se violation.
At the first step, the parents and child would carry the burden of demonstrating that the school failed to implement the IEP.
This step would operate like a per se test: The court would not
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screen out failures to implement that it deems immaterial, insignificant, or insubstantial. The parents would have to show evidence of the implementation failures, and the school could rebut
those facts and argue that it followed the IEP.
The most likely source of conflict at this stage, then, would be
interpreting the written terms of the IEP in order to determine
whether what actually occurred was consistent with what was
promised. Although burdensome, both the materiality and per se
inquiries require the court to perform this role at some point. The
materiality standard permits judges to be less precise about what
exactly the IEP calls for because they only need to decide if what
the child received was in the realm of what was offered. Yet it
seems preferable for judges to be more precise about what they
understand an IEP to require—it helps parents know what to expect and encourages schools to draft IEPs more clearly. Moreover,
interpreting language in a written document is squarely within
judges’ expertise.
2. The affirmative defense.
At this point, the burden would shift to the school district to
assert its affirmative defense in order to avoid liability. The defense has two prongs. First, the school district must demonstrate
that the implementation failure was the result of an unforeseen
or unavoidable circumstance.199 We’ve already seen the examples
of a stay-put IEP or an emergency situation. Other simple examples might include a teacher quitting, a critical technology malfunctioning, or some other turn of events that the IEP team did
not contemplate and could not have been reasonably expected to
plan for.
This should be distinguished from gaps in resources or capability that the school either did foresee or should have foreseen

199 This prong is similar in some ways to a thoughtful theory proposed by Jeffrey
Knight in a student comment. Knight suggested that courts “look[ ] simply at why the
failure occurred” when resolving any implementation cases that arise in the “gray area”
between de minimis failures and material or substantial failures. Knight, supra note 23
at 404 (emphasis omitted). Under his theory, the “intent of the actor—typically the teacher
or a school administrator—becomes paramount in determining whether an IEP violation
has occurred.” Id. Some of the benefits of this theory are similar to benefits with this Comment’s proposed approach—encouraging IEP revision and avoiding “abstract inquiries
into the significance of IEP provisions.” Id. However, this Comment’s proposed approach
is distinct in several ways: the burden-shifting element, the focus on objective factors in
the first prong as opposed to intent, and the requirement of the second response prong are
a few of the differences.
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while forming the IEP. For example, promising a certain kind of
therapy while not having anyone trained in that therapy nor realistic plans to recruit or train someone would not be sufficient to
justify after-the-fact deviations. In such instances, the school
would be held to the letter of the IEP and would have to compensate the child for what was lost or reimburse the parents for replacement services already purchased. Parents and school districts can still have aspirational provisions in IEPs and use the
document as a signal of forward commitment, but the IEP should
reflect realistic expectations as far as timeline and certainty. For
example, if the school does not have a properly equipped quiet
room, but the parents advocate for it strenuously in IEP meetings
and the school is convinced that the quiet room is a good idea, the
IEP can contain the school’s commitment to add a quiet room. If
unexpected difficulties arise in creating it, the school would have
this affirmative defense available. In other words, IEPs should be
explicit about which provisions are aspirational and which ones
establish immediate expectations.
The facts of Spring Branch provide another example of the
value of this first prong of the affirmative defense. In Spring
Branch, as described above, the student’s IEP did not include
clarification about how school officials should respond in “emergency” situations, such as danger to the safety of the student,
classmates, or teachers.200 This Comment already expressed some
concern about why, given the student’s history, the IEP did not
provide for such emergency circumstances. Requiring the school
to explain its decision would encourage courts to focus that inquiry. Should the IEP have contemplated such circumstances?
Overall, it would be better for students, school officials, and
parents if challenging situations that are reasonably foreseeable
are dealt with during the deliberative IEP process, with the input
and understanding of all parties, rather than addressed in the
moment and with results that shock students and families. More
facts would be needed about the circumstances in Spring Branch
to determine whether the school district would have been liable
under this requirement. The point here is that foreseeability of
the circumstances—rather than how far the response deviated
from what the IEP did specify—is the proper inquiry.
The second prong of the affirmative defense addresses the
school’s response to the unforeseen circumstances, which must be

200

See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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proportional to the challenge posed by the circumstances. This
prong is a flexible inquiry, designed to ensure that schools do not
throw their hands up in the face of unforeseen circumstances but
rather make a concerted effort to address the situation, support
the child’s education in conformity with the previous IEP, involve
the parents in collaborative and responsive decision-making, and
amend the IEP to reflect any changes as soon as practicable.
Courts should place a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of requiring amendment through the IDEA’s statutory processes.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach in L.J. provides support for
the second prong of the affirmative defense. The school district
was implementing a stay-put IEP that was inapplicable in many
respects to the student’s new school, and the court found it legally
relevant that “the school did not simply sit on its hands” in response to indications that L.J. was not progressing under the IEP
but instead offered “a wide range of supports.” 201 The court essentially found that the school did the best that it could have done,
which has little to do with materiality. The court wanted to distinguish between good and bad responses to unavoidable circumstances that interfere with perfect compliance—rewarding and
incentivizing the former while penalizing and disincentivizing the
latter. This second prong allows courts to do so.
It’s important to note that this prong is not a materiality inquiry. Under the materiality standard, the comparison is between
what was offered and what was given, with the judge often making decisions about educational quality and importance. In contrast, this proportional-response prong compares the difficulties
created by the unforeseen or unavoidable situation to the efforts
that the school made in response. At this stage of the analysis,
judges should consider factors like the extent to which the parents
were involved in responsive decision-making, how promptly the
school moved to amend the IEP to account for the disruption, and
what compensatory services were offered in response relative to
what the school had available. Another important distinction between the use of proportionality in the burden-shifting test and
the materiality inquiry is that this analysis is performed only after the court has already identified meaningfully changed circumstances that made IEP implementation fail. Any concerns about
unworkability or lack of notice are lessened because schools would
not draft and parents would not negotiate IEPs with the

201

L.J., 927 F.3d at 1218–19.
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proportional-response prong of the defense in mind. In other
words, the flexibility of the proportionality prong is earned by the
unforeseen- or unavoidable-circumstances prong.
The initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic provide a good
example for the test. A substantial number of IEPs were massively disrupted, with serious consequences for children with disabilities and their families. At least in theory, a materiality
analysis would have, after the fact, afforded those families relief
for the gap between the IEP and what they received. But a materiality analysis, which is already difficult to perform, is especially
complicated in a disaster context. First, courts likely and understandably would consider whether the school district could have
avoided the failure or whether it acted proportionally in response
to the circumstances. The proposed approach would focus that inquiry and help calibrate the proper amount of flexibility. The proposed rule would have allowed some IEP deviations in the immediate wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, which was unforeseen and
unavoidable, so long as the school’s response was proportional in
light of the circumstances. At some point, however, some amount
of continued COVID-19 disruption became foreseeable, and IEPs
had to be amended and written in response to those circumstances. Second, parents would have to attribute lack of progress
or regression to the implementation, which is challenging even
without the massive disruption of a pandemic, isolation, and lockdowns. Third, judges would be entirely focused on assessing
whether virtual services were an appropriate substitute for inperson ones. This is a gargantuan task, especially in the context
of an unprecedented disruption in which experts are still studying
the impacts on children with disabilities.
Under the proposed approach, however, judges would focus
instead on how the school responded in the immediate aftermath
of the crisis given the resources available. Questions that courts
would consider include: How involved were the parents in decision-making about remote services and education? How effectively did the school utilize its available resources in the immediate scramble when the pandemic hit? Once it became clear that
the pandemic was a long-term disruption, did the school amend
IEPs to address the new reality? Did IEPs reflect the possibility
of future outbreaks to the extent that they were foreseeable?
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B. Benefits
This approach integrates the benefits of both the materiality
inquiry and the per se rule. It honors several aspects of the statutory scheme by respecting the judgment of the school decision
makers and parents who thoughtfully and collaboratively constructed an IEP and by not second-guessing the importance of any
of the provisions. For the same reasons, it gives due weight to the
tradeoffs that parents made in advocating for their child in the
process. It respects the IDEA’s IEP-revision provisions by channeling changes to the IEP back into that process as soon as practicable rather than by allowing them on an ad hoc basis as long
as they’re deemed immaterial. It is in line with the “in conformity
with” language of § 1401(9)(D), which calls for correspondence
with the plan but contemplates something less than precise compliance. And it is more consistent with the Rowley–Endrew F. line
of precedent by pulling back the deference to school decision makers where it isn’t governed by the IDEA’s procedure, reemphasizing the process that allows for individualization, and avoiding the
theoretical gap between content and substance inquiries created
by bare-minimum IEPs. This Section elaborates on the benefits of
the proposed approach.
1. Honoring the IEP process.
First, and most importantly, this test funnels decisions about
what it means for a child to receive a FAPE back into the IEP
formation, revision, and evaluation processes. If circumstances or
the opinions of school officials change, then the IEP itself must be
changed. The IEP process is the core of the statutory scheme. Under the proposed rule, school districts would lose an implementation challenge for knowingly flouting an IEP instead of revising
it. This could happen either because the school knew in formulating the IEP that it wouldn’t be able to live up to the content (and
thus the affirmative defense would fail under prong one) or because the school did not proceed to amend the IEP in response to
changed circumstances (and thus would fail under prong two). If
the content of the revised IEP is below the statutory minimum
required by Endrew F., then the school district would lose a content challenge—but that would not factor into the implementation analysis. In this way, substantive decisions about educational quality will be kept in the content context rather than
shoehorned into an implementation inquiry.
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One possible objection to this focus on process is the power
differential in IEP-formation proceedings. While parents can provide input, if the school decision makers continue to disagree,
then parents’ only recourse is to threaten or pursue administrative proceedings and litigation, both of which are expensive and
time-consuming. Further, parents suffer from information asymmetries relative to the school.202 Specifically, they probably lack
the school’s specialized information about their child’s ability
level, knowledge of the school’s resources and options for providing support, or awareness of the legal regime itself.203 This is especially true given Supreme Court decisions denying parents reimbursement for educational experts and other nonlegal costs of
challenging an IEP.204 The threat of further action is sometimes
insufficient leverage to exert pressure in the IEP process.205 These
disparities make the ability of parents to influence their child’s
education dependent on the family’s resources, frequently pushing lower-income parents out of the process despite the IDEA’s
formal protections.206 As such, recentering the procedural protections may be misguided.
Ultimately, however, these unequal dynamics are a broader
critique of the IDEA’s approach. The proportionality prong does
require that parents have an understanding of the school’s capabilities in the face of a challenge and a sense of whether the school
could have expected the challenge causing the implementation
failure to arise. Arguably, parents could be in a better position to
assess whether something is important to their child’s education—as they have to show under the existing materiality test.
However, in order to win an implementation challenge, the
parents still have to prove to courts (which are inclined to be deferential to school districts) that the missing service was material.
The proposed rule addresses these unequal dynamics better than
the materiality test does: It shifts the burden to the school district
to assert the affirmative defense, making it easier for parents to
bring these claims and have leverage in negotiations. It does not
require parents to have specialized knowledge about the

202 See Claire Raj & Emily Suski, Endrew F.’s Unintended Consequences, 46 J.L. &
EDUC. 499, 506–10 (2017).
203 See id.
204 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006).
205 Raj & Suski, supra note 202, at 508–09, 518–19.
206 Id. at 516–22.
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materiality of any particular provision nor expert testimony to
that effect.
2. Calibrating incentives.
Second, this Comment’s proposed test better calibrates the
dynamic relationship between IEP formation and the implementation standard. Proponents of the per se rule have not fully considered the incentives that it would create for school districts to
lower the quality of IEPs and provide any additional services over
and above the IEP outside the IDEA’s prescribed process without
its informational benefits. In other words, stricter implementation standards (including the proposed approach, relative to the
materiality standard) are likely to lower the ambition and detail
of IEPs. On the other hand, courts expounding a materiality
standard have failed to grapple with the incentive to overpromise
and thus prevent parents from making their concerns heard or
escalating disagreements about content prior to implementation.
More permissive implementation standards push the hard
choices about a student’s education out of the IEP process and
away from the administrative and judicial checks mandated by
Rowley and Endrew F. The proposed test is a middle ground, cognizant of these dynamic effects. The proposed test forces difficult
decisions about resource tradeoffs into the IEP process. A school
might also be incentivized, under the proposed approach, to be
more explicit about when and how it might adopt certain “reach”
services, seeking permission for flexibility rather than asking
courts for forgiveness.
3. Improving notice and predictability.
Third, and relatedly, the proposed test gives the regulated
parties and the rights holders far better notice than the materiality approach. Parents could rely on an IEP being implemented
as written—except in the context of exceptional circumstances, in
which case they could expect short-term, remedial efforts and
prompt revision. School districts would be put on alert that they
generally have to deliver what is promised and will compose IEPs
that are achievable. At the same time, school districts would know
that they will and do have flexibility in the face of true disruptions: this should make them less fearful about offering certain
services and better able to act to support students in the face of a
crisis. Even if courts were to interpret the unavoidable-andunforeseen-circumstances prong leniently, giving schools leeway
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as long as there is a colorable argument that the IEP team was
surprised by the change in circumstances, at least parents would
have a sense of when the IEP would and wouldn’t be binding on
the school from that precedent.
The bottom line for both the second and third arguments is
this: Under the materiality test, the school is incentivized to overpromise and underperform the IEP, and there isn’t a clear doctrinal way to address it. Under the per se rule, however, the liability
risk is so high that schools would promise as little as they could,
and anything more that they do for students would happen outside the IEP process. In an ideal world, the school would use the
IEP process to find and adopt solutions optimized for each child’s
situation and the school’s available resources. Schools would be
realistic about what could be accomplished with the knowledge
that there would be some amount of flexibility if circumstances
changed in a way the school didn’t or couldn’t predict. The proposed approach is an attempt to bring us closer to that world than
either the materiality or the per se test would.
4. Harnessing the court’s institutional competence.
Fourth, judges have greater institutional competence in making the decisions called for by the proposed rule. The first step
involves a potentially complex, but conceptually straightforward,
assessment of the facts of implementation and a student’s education. It might also involve interpreting IEP terms, but, as mentioned above, courts are well-equipped to perform that task. The
second step involves an unavoidability or foreseeability inquiry
and a proportionality inquiry, neither of which requires making
substantive judgments about how an IEP is supposed to work as
a whole, comparability of similar but different services, or how
much progress a child might have been expected to make given
their particular circumstances. Instead, judges assess whether
(1) the school exercised its judgment about its own capabilities
during the IEP’s creation, and (2) the school responded promptly
and proportionally once circumstances forced deviation from
the IEP.
5. Addressing information and expertise asymmetry.
Fifth, by shifting the burden to the school district to
demonstrate an affirmative defense in the implementation context, the proposed test helps address the issues of information and
expertise asymmetry that make it hard for parents to bring
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claims. Burden shifting is not a cure-all for resource disparities
or other inequities in litigation. However, the school district is
well equipped to justify its decisions whereas parents suffer from
an informational asymmetry; the IEP process is meant to bring
parents into the fold and cure that imbalance, but, in implementation cases, the school has strayed from the IEP that the parents
helped to craft.207 Given that imbalance, parents are less equipped
to bear the burden in an implementation case than a content case.
Further, because these disparities between parents and schools
disproportionately impact low-income families,208 the proposed
rule makes implementation challenges more equitably available.
Parents would not need to pay out of pocket for experts to
demonstrate that the education their child actually received was
insufficient under Rowley and Endrew F. or was meaningfully
and significantly different from what was agreed upon. To shift
the burden, parents need only demonstrate that what their child
received was not what was agreed upon. Parents will likely still
need expertise to respond to the school’s assertion of its affirmative defense, but information about a school’s resources and the
state of its planning requires less expertise to analyze than reports about education. For example, if a school promises a quiet
room, has no quiet room, and makes no effort to equip a quiet
room for several of the months in which the quiet room was
promised, it’s hard to imagine what role expertise would play. The
burden shifting could also alter the dynamics of prelitigation
negotiation.
A brief word on the legality of this burden shifting. The Supreme Court held in Schaffer that the burdens of proof and persuasion in a challenge to the content of an IEP are on the party
seeking relief.209 There are several reasons why this does not pose
a problem for the proposed test. First, Schaffer did not extend the
principle to implementation challenges.210 Second, the Court
noted that placing the burden of persuasion on plaintiffs with regard to “the essential aspects of their claims” is a “default rule”
that “admits of exceptions.”211 One noted exception is when certain “elements can fairly be characterized as affirmative defenses
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Id. at 506.
Id. at 516–22.
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 56–58.

1066

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:4

or exemptions.”212 Third, the Court’s IDEA-specific reasoning
about burdens does not apply to the implementation context. For
example, the Court refused to “assume that every IEP is invalid
until the school district demonstrates that it is not” by requiring
the school district to carry the burdens.213 The proposed burden
shifting wouldn’t have that effect. Fourth, the Court invokes Congress’s faith in the collaborative procedures, citing Rowley’s description of a “legislative conviction that adequate compliance
with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much
if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.”214 Putting a burden on the school in the implementation context carries with it no problematic presumptions
about IEP invalidity—in fact, it honors the validity of the IEP
initially created and furthers parents’ ability to trust that it will
be implemented. Fifth, and most importantly, the proposed test
does not run afoul of Schaffer because the initial burdens are still
placed on the party seeking relief for the underlying claim. The
proposed test allows the school to assert and win a defense that
would insulate it from liability under certain circumstances—but
only where the plaintiff has already carried their burden regarding the failure to implement.
CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzed an underdiscussed aspect of the
IDEA’s delivery of education and services to children with disabilities: What happens after an IEP has been agreed upon and the
school has to carry it out, but the school arguably fails to meet its
responsibility? Part II established how courts have understood
the predominant materiality inquiry in failure-to-implement
cases and concluded that the approach is both unworkable and
unwarranted. This Comment also established the many issues
with both the materiality standard and the per se rule—the materiality standard’s only judicially identified alternative. The materiality standard circumvents the procedural protections of the
IDEA; provides little predictability to parents and schools and little guidance to courts; forces judges away from areas of institutional competence; and incentivizes school districts to overpromise and underdeliver, creating a doctrinal gap between
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content and implementation challenges that allows students’ substantive right to a FAPE to fall through the cracks. The per se
rule, on the other hand, is insufficiently flexible given both practical concerns and statutory constraints, would disincentivize ambition and innovation in IEPs, and is unlikely to be adopted. Finally, this Comment proposed an alternative test that addresses
the greatest concerns with both the materiality and per se approaches. Part III sketched out the broad contours of the test,
gave concrete guidance on how it might operate, argued for its
consistency with the statute and precedent, and articulated additional benefits that it might generate.
The IDEA was enacted to cure a grave societal ill. The statute
incorporated parents into decision-making about the quality and
content of their child’s education and attempted to ensure that
educational plans were deliberately constructed and individualized. The IDEA also introduced procedures for managing disagreement between parents and the rest of the IEP team.
On top of those important procedural rights, the statute created a substantive right to an education of a certain quality. As
the Court described in Rowley and Endrew F., the aim of the statute was to actually provide the opportunity for educational advancement to children with disabilities. A “free appropriate public education” means something, but defining it is a challenge.
Given all that, it’s understandable—even desirable—that a substantial amount of scholarly literature and case law has focused
on understanding the IDEA’s procedural requirements and exploring the meaning of FAPE in the IEP context. However, the
current materiality approach undermines the value of the procedural protections and the underlying substantive rights. The
problems identified with the per se approach, from a legal and
policy perspective, are also well-taken. The search for an implementation standard must go on.
While one contribution of this Comment is the proposed test
itself, perhaps more important is its attempt to prompt further
discussion about intermediate approaches that might replace the
binary choice between materiality and per se that has dominated
scholarship and judicial decision-making. Additional research
might raise further issues with the proposed approach or identify
an entirely new alternative that better addresses the concerns
raised in this Comment. Courts will be able to better calibrate the
flexibility that schools require with the deliberation and quality
created by the IEP process, resulting in better educational
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outcomes for students with disabilities. The implementation portion of IDEA litigation matters. Certainly, children with disabilities and their families deserve the follow-through.

